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1 INTRODUCTION 
Humans are social beings. We experience ourselves through others. A lot of communication has now 
moved to online spaces.  As the European Court of Human Rights put it in 2015, the internet provides 
“essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of 
general interest” (ECHR 2015).  In that sense, it is well accepted that “the internet plays a particularly 
important role with respect to the right to freedom of expression” (Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe 2018), and that this role relies on private intermediaries’ digital platforms that not 
just regulate access to the online communication space, but constitute – through their rules – large 
parts of it (Kettemann/Schulz 2020).   
 
Given the normative frame for online communication is thus to a large extent defined by private 
actors, how can states, citizens and users influence the rules which determine the limits of what may 
be said online? Do rules formulated exclusively by intermediaries exercising their rights ipso facto 
suffer a legitimacy deficit? Can stronger interventions by states into private processes of rulemaking 
and -enforcement improve this status quo (Kettemann/Tiedeke 2020), or do they constitute an even 
larger danger (Fertmann/Kettemann 2021)? Is the normative friction between the Old and the “New 
Governors” (Klonick 2017) ever increasing, or rather apt for dissolvement through a stronger mutual 
integration of private and public rule-making systems into more symbiotic relationships? If the latter 
is the case, how could such a re-integration look like? 
2 STATES VS. INTERMEDIARIES  
When considering approaches to dissolving the sometimes messy regulatory private-public simulta-
neity, one may consider full-scale state interventions in order to establish democratically legitimate 
and accountable oversight. However, recent examples for the dangers associated with such an ap-
proach tell a cautionary tale, even for presumably robust democracies, as such an interventionism is 
prone to escalate into officeholders attacking intermediaries as proxies for suppressing political 
speech and public discourses. Repressive regulation, bans of intermediaries’ platforms or even crim-
inal prosecution and imprisonment of employees – or the threat of any of these restrictions – have 
recently been used in translucent  schemes to make intermediaries’ intervene in favor of those in 
power in Belarus (Human Rights Watch 2020), India (Mahapatra/Fertmann/Kettemann 2021), My-
anmar (Irving 2019), Nigeria (Nwokoro 2021), Russia (Roache 2021) and in the United States under 
the previous administration (Duan/Westling 2020), sometimes in contradiction to the respective 
states’  obligations under international human rights law. Therefore incentives for intermediaries’ 
non-compliance with state requests are needed, if and to the extent which these requests are incon-
sistent with applicable international law. 
3 INTERMEDIARIES VS. STATES  
The global conversation around the question who the least-worst actor to control speech on the inter-
net is, states or private platforms, is on the other hand also driven forward by cases in which interme-
diaries destabilize or even restrict states and public actors through and on their platforms.   Interme-
diaries’ acting against (perceived) harmful communication of government agencies, public office 
holders and politicians, such as in the case of the deplatforming of former U.S. president Trump, 
justifiably also face significant scrutiny for the increase of intermediaries’ discursive power 
 
associated with them.  Next to this specific facet, general concerns relating to confining private power 
over individual freedoms and securing the societal prerequisites of social cohesion accentuate the 
need for increasing accountability of intermediaries’ governance systems.  
4 DEMOCRATIZING INTERMEDIARIES  
Against this background, it seems almost unavoidable that institutions for overseeing intermediaries’  
governance systems emerge that are constructed from a public/societal as well as a private point of 
view: in an environment in which many societies welcome certain measures against content well 
below the threshold of illegality, but are weary of the corresponding concentration of power in  com-
panies’ and states’ hands,  there is not much else to turn to than non-state, non-corporate institutional 
arrangements. Such “Social Media Councils” (Article 19 2018; Kaye 2018) may function as a point 
of entry for adapted versions of rule of law-principles or even be a starting point for re-importing 
democratic values into intermediaries’ private orders. Such models may amount to a democratization 
or even socialization of intermediaries. 
 
These institutions can be designed as enablers of political (user, citizen) participation or as expert-
based, private reconfigurations of rule of law-principles. They may be implemented through self-
regulation (cf. Facebook Oversight Board) or co-regulation (cf. NetzDG-review panels), as part of 
larger community moderation systems (Wikipedia Arbitration Committees) or as “soft” advisory in-
stitutions (e.g. TikTok regional councils; Twitter Trust and Safety Council) (see Kettemann/Fertmann 
2021).  
 
This concept is thus far being applied only to improve companies’ governance systems, but it holds 
promise also for disincentivizing company compliance with unlawful State requests (Do-
nahoe/Hughes/Kaye 2019, p. 13; Douek 2020; Mahapatra/Fertmann/Kettemann 2021) and could 
therefore also dissolve some normative friction in constellations of “States vs. Intermediaries”. 
 
While the existing institutional concepts fall into very different places on the scale between institu-
tional mimicry/whitewahsing and meaningful separation of private power, they all still fall short of 
bridging the regulatory public/private disconnect: existing voluntary self-regulation configurations 
lack democratic legitimacy and robust enforcement; co-regulatory configurations such as the German 
NetzDG’s review panels have trouble interconnecting with the institutional dynamics of companies’ 
governance systems, thus leaving much of the potential of these institutions unused. A democratic 
approach is therefore needed, reimporting democratic legitimacy through co-regulatory platform 
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